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Abstract
After Bonn and Marrakech it is likely that emission trading will be realized in
the near future. Major inﬂuences on the permit market are the institutional details,
the participation structure and the treatment of hot air. Diﬀerent scenarios do not
only diﬀer in their implications for the demand and supply of permits and thus the
permit price, but also in their allocative eﬀects. Most repercussions can be expected
to stem from the eﬀects on the world markets for fossil fuel and especially the oil
market. For example the withdrawal of the USA from the Kyoto Protocol and the
allocation mechanism for the hot air in Russia, Ukraine and Eastern Europe inﬂuence
the level of energy demand and gross and net energy prices which in turn change
the production structure of energy intensive goods and inﬂuence welfare depending on
whether a country is an energy net exporter or importer.
In this paper we discuss diﬀerent institutional designs for hot air trading combined
with the US withdrawal and quantify the eﬀects by using a computable general equilib-
rium model. Besides detailed results for the analyzed scenarios, two major ﬁndings are
relevant for future studies on emission trading: First, marginal abatement cost curves
are not as stable as presumed up to now. Second, we ﬁnd that indeed the allocative
repercussions of a scenario are to a large degree determined by its eﬀects on world energy
demand and world energy prices. Both ﬁndings imply that partial equilibrium models
of permit trading that are based on marginal abatement curves ignore the important
interaction between the permit market and the world energy markets.
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21 Introduction
The Kyoto-Protocol marks the ﬁrst instance in which a multinational and potentially global
emission trading system has become part of an international treaty. The introduction of
emission trading has long been advocated by economists because of its eﬃciency aspects.
Yet, the theoretically appealing concept has undergone several adjustments and reﬁnements
in the international political practice and it has been rejected by the United States govern-
ment. As a consequence, it is not at all clear what the emission trading scheme will bring
in terms of eﬀectiveness, i.e. how much emission reduction will it eventually achieve, and in
terms of its economic performance, i.e. what allocation eﬀects are to be expected. Several
studies have already attempted to narrow in on the range of prices of emission permits and
on the resulting savings of marginal abatement costs for diﬀerent regions (Weyant 1999;
Boehringer 2001; Boehringer and Loeschl 2002; den Elzen and de Moor 2001a). So far, the
narrowing has not been too successful as Klaassen and Percl (2002) ﬁnd in their paper.
The divergence of results has many causes: modelling philosophies, complications of the
deﬁnition of reduction commitments during the Bonn-Marrakech-Accords, the withdrawal
of the United States from the Kyoto-Protocol, and ﬁnally the issue of hot air. In this paper
we try to identify the impacts as well as the interactions of three of these aspects which we
believe to constitute important determinants of the likely eﬀects of international emission
trading (IET) according to the Kyoto rules. The three major inﬂuences to be considered
are
² the participation structure of the emission trading regime, i.e. the role of the USA,
² the institutional details of the permit allocation especially in countries with hot air,
and
² the likely supply of hot air in the commitment period of the Kyoto-Protocol.
These three aspects are closely linked. The permit allocation within the two major suppliers
of hot air, Russia and the Ukraine, has repercussions on the global permit market, and at
the same time it inﬂuences the ability of these two countries to strategically control the
global permit market. Similarly, the participation or non-participation of the USA in global
trading inﬂuences the permit market, the climate protection costs of other regions and the
beneﬁts from strategic restrictions of hot air supplies.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a qualitative discussion of these
interactions and tries to give some intuition for the likely allocation eﬀects of the trading
regime agreed so far. Section 3 then presents some practical aspects of determining the
size and the functioning of the market for greenhouse gas permits. The selection and exact
3deﬁnition of the scenarios for emission trading is done in Section 4. Section 5 presents the
results of the simulations with the CGE model DART both with respect to the participation
of the USA and with respect to the likely supply of hot air. The paper ends with some
conclusions and an appendix which gives a short description of the DART-Model.
2 Allocation Eﬀects in the Market for Greenhouse Gas Emis-
sions
2.1 The Impact of the Participation of the USA
In 2001 the new Bush adminstration announced that the USA are no longer willing to
fulﬁll their Kyoto commitment, declaring the Kyoto-Protocol as ”fatally ﬂawed” (Bush-
Administration 2001). Instead of ﬁxed emission reductions the USA aim now to reduce
their greenhouse gas intensity by 18% over the next ten years (Bush-Administration 2002).
Though Bush claims that this would lead to 100 MtC less emissions in 2012, it is question-
able if the plan implies any emission reductions at all. Without CO2 abatement in the USA
the amount of emission reductions of greenhouse gases associated with the Kyoto Protocol
decreases from 5% to less than 1% relative to 1990 emissions. Furthermore, unrestricted
economic growth in the USA will inﬂuence resource allocation world-wide, as world-market
prices will respond in a globalizing world.
The most important impact of an American withdrawal from the Kyoto-Protocol is, of
course, the rise in world energy prices because the additional energy demand from the USA
will certainly have an impact on world markets. If this eﬀect is large enough it will also
lead to an adjustment of production, consumption and trade ﬂows in all other economies.
A second important eﬀect concerns the marginal abatement costs of the other Annex-B
countries. Since the reduction commitments of these economies are not changed, but the
energy prices net of any climate policy induced mark-ups increase, the marginal abatement
cost for reducing the emissions of greenhouse gases tend to fall. Again, the size of this eﬀect
is uncertain. It will essentially depend on the size of the energy price eﬀect net of taxes or
permit prices and the price ﬂexibility of world supplies of fossil fuels.
2.2 Institutional Details of International Trading
At ﬁrst sight and according to standard economic theory, the way in which emission per-
mits are allocated in each state - whether through auctioning, grandfathering, or updating
(Baron and Bygrave 2002) - should not make a diﬀerence in terms of its allocation eﬀect.
4The only indirect eﬀect would come through diﬀerent income eﬀects depending on where
the ownership of emission rights and the subsequent rents are located. However, at least
for the large participants of an international emissions trading regime with a considerable
amount of hot air the institutional design of permit allocation makes an important diﬀer-
ence. There are essentially two states which have been allocated most of the hot air in the
Kyoto-Protocol and the Bonn-Marrakech-Agreements, Russia and the Ukraine (they are
subsumed in the simulations later under FSU/EEC).
As the FSU/EEC is the largest seller of permits in the case of unrestricted emission trading,
it is obvious that the FSU/EEC has the potential to inﬂuence the trading price of permits to
maximize its proﬁts from selling hot air or maximize welfare. As monopoly power implies a
small number of sellers the studies that analyze market power implicitly assume that trading
would take place in a centralized fashion and not through a large number of domestic entities
that could act as independent agents (Baron 1999). The Kyoto Protocol and its related
decisions do not explicitly state who is actually supposed to be trading. Probably we will
see both government and ﬁrm trading. The modalities for emission trading adopted in
Marrakech (UNFCCC 2001) state that to participate in IET Annex B countries have to
establish national registries, that transfers and acquisitions between these registries shall
be made under the responsibility of the Parties and that if a Party authorizes legal entities
to transfer and/or acquire permits it has to supervise that it acts in accordance with the
rules and remains responsible for the fulﬁllment of its obligations (Article 5). This suggests
that it will be indeed national registries, that will trade with other national registries and
act as a clearing board for national ﬁrms, so that market power might indeed be a relevant
issue. On the other hand, as the Joint Implementation mechanism (JI) is seen as a chance
for private investments in mitigation technologies, private ﬁrms are likely to be part of JI
projects and this is nothing but some kind of emission trading on ﬁrm level.
The question remains though, how the governments will distribute their assigned amount
units (AAU). Will they sell them to local ﬁrms, or grandfather them for free? Will they
distribute all their AAU to domestic ﬁrms or keep some to trade with international ﬁrms or
registries themselves? The economic eﬀects of these alternative permit allocation schemes
are likely to be small in economies without hot air. Grandfathering, i.e. free allowances
to local emitters, creates an income eﬀect for those receiving the permits and it leaves the
government without revenues from permit sales. The size of this income eﬀect is conﬁned
to the question whether diﬀerent demand structures and diﬀerent propensities to consume
exist between the groups that might receive the rents from allocating emission permits. In
fact, in a world with perfect competition, a constant government budget surplus or deﬁcit,
and with representative consumers and producers - as it is usually assumed in CGE-models
- there is no diﬀerence in the allocation. Of course, the rents to speciﬁc groups in the case
5of grandfathering or additional government revenues in the case of an auctioning of permits
change the internal distribution of incomes. Such distributional issues are not subject of
this paper.
In economies with a considerable amount of hot air the allocation scheme does matter.
Essentially three institutional settings with diﬀering repercussions on international permit
markets can be considered. First, governments of economies with hot air can insulate their
domestic industries and consumers emitting greenhouse gases from the international permit
market by relying on state trading on the international permit market and by issuing free
permits to local emitters which are not tradable internationally. Hence, the governments
can maintain a zero domestic price for emissions and they can choose the amount of hot
air that is sold internationally at the then prevailing world market prices (Scenario ET1).
The second option is to include the domestic ﬁrms in emission trading and charge the
same price to all emitters - domestic and foreign. In this case, state trading - i.e. only
the government can in the ﬁrst place sell permits - allows a government to strategically
restrict the total supply of emission permits at its disposal (ET2). In this setting no price
wedge is driven between national and foreign permit prices. Against the background of JI
this scenario can also be interpreted the way that only the government is participating in
IET wile the domestic ﬁrms are required to hold emission permits and are allowed to take
part in JI projects to sell or acquire permits. As noted above, under usual CGE model
assumptions it does not matter whether the domestic ﬁrms have to buy their rights from
the government of receive permits for their business as usual emissions for free.
The third option of grandfathering all permits to local emitters or citizens according to
some rule would most likely preclude any strategic behavior because it would eﬀectively
produce perfect competition on the supply side of the permit market. The governments
registry would only administer the bookkeeping of all permit sales with foreigners (ET3).
In such a case all permits including all hot air would be used either domestically or sold
on international markets. As in the second option, permit prices domestically and world
market prices will equalize but at a much lower level.
State trading of excess amounts of permits not used inside the country will give local
emitters a free endowment of permits which results in an improvement of comparative
advantage of the energy intensive producers on world markets. It also gives the government
the ability to strategically manipulate the supply of hot air, i.e. of additional emission
permits, on world markets.
To the contrary, a grandfathering of all permits to local emitters will remove this strategic
ability, but it will also endow ﬁrms with an additional source of income. However, some
studies (Boehringer 2001; Loeschl and Zhang 2002; den Elzen and de Moor 2001b) claim
6that this income can not be generated since the permit price might drop to zero. This
depends essentially on the hypothesis that grandfathered permits will lead to a competitive
supply behavior, hence revenue maximization with hot air on international markets by
restricting supply is not possible.
If there is state trading and the economies with hot air are able to coordinate their supply
behavior they can reap considerable rents from restricting supplies. But these gains depend
not only on the ability to coordinate strategies between the largest hot air countries. The
just mentioned internal institutional settings are important as well. Hence, a careful treat-
ment of the institutional details of permit allocation and permit trading in the economies
with hot air is necessary in order to correctly simulate the likely allocation eﬀects.
2.3 What is to be maximized with restricted supplies of Hot Air?
If the hot air economies want to act as a cartel, the question arises what kind of objective
function they follow in determining the optimal supply of hot air. Many partial equilibrium
studies (Boehringer and Loeschl 2001; Burniaux 1999) simply presume that revenue from
selling hot air is to be maximized, while some sort of welfare maximization is assumed in
general equilibrium analysis (Boehringer 2001; Bernstein, Montgomery, Rutherford, and
Yang 1999). Though Babiker, Jacoby, Reilly, and Reiner (2002) state that both lead ap-
proximately to the same result, this need not be the case since restricting hot air has not
only revenue but also allocation eﬀects, the most important one coming through the impact
of hot air trading on the world market prices for fossil energy net of taxes or permit prices.
An increase in the supply of hot air on international markets ﬁrst of all lowers permit
prices. Some studies claim that they can drop as low as to a zero price. Yet, at the same
time the sale of hot air increases the demand for fossil energy and thus energy prices net
of permit prices will rise. However, in economies restricted by the Kyoto-commitments
gross energy prices will fall. This will in turn aﬀect the comparative advantage of energy
intensive industries in the diﬀerent economies and change trade ﬂows and as a consequence
aﬀect welfare. Since the region FSU/EEC is a strong net exporter of fossil energy and of
energy intensive products rising net energy prices in their export markets would increase
the comparative advantage of these sectors. In addition, the fall in gross energy prices will
shift demand towards more energy intensive goods in the Annex B countries. This will need
to be balanced against the rising energy prices in Non-Annex B countries whose demand for
energy and energy intensive products will fall. The net eﬀect of this price eﬀect on demand
and on competitiveness in the diﬀerent economies can only be assessed quantitatively.
72.4 The interaction of national permit regulation and hot air trading
Studying the impact of the diﬀerent internal allocation regimes of hot air on the global
permit market is necessary if the regions involved are large enough to inﬂuence world market
prices through their actions. This is most likely true for the countries with a signiﬁcant
amount of hot air, i.e. Russia and the Ukraine. The two options for these governments -
participating in global trading without having local trading and global trading with local
emitters facing the same permit prices - will have diﬀerent allocative eﬀects.
If the region FSU/EEC decides not to charge the local emitters of CO2 the world market
permit price or not to allow these emitters to sell grandfathered emission rights on the
global permit market, it can sell a restricted amount of hot air on world markets in such
a way as to maximize government revenue or welfare. At the same time local fossil energy
users do not face an emission constraint nor do they have an incentive to reduce emissions.
Selling hot air then has several eﬀects:
² It raises government revenue in economies with hot air (revenue eﬀect),
² by lowering the global emissions constraint it reduces gross energy prices in the other
Annex B countries (marginal abatement cost eﬀect)
² these lower gross energy prices raise world demand for fossil fuels - compared to a
situation without hot air trading - thus leading to higher energy prices even in the
countries not participating in emission trading (demand eﬀect).
In hot air economies, an additional supply of hot air will - besides raising government
revenues - increase exports (resp. reduce imports) of fossil fuels through the demand eﬀect.
At the same time local producers of energy intensive goods face higher energy prices whereas
foreign producers may or may not experience an increase in energy costs. In particular, the
other Annex B countries have lower gross energy prices thus increasing demand and Non-
Annex B countries experience higher prices with a reduction in demand. Hence, a shift of
energy intensive production away from hot air countries and Non-Annex B countries towards
the abating countries will take place resulting in the a change in comparative advantage
and possible welfare losses to the hot air suppliers. As a consequence, maximizing permit
revenues and maximizing welfare will not yield identical optimal hot air amounts to be sold
by the FSU/EEC. If the welfare eﬀects from direct fuel exports dominate the indirect eﬀect
through the energy intensive goods then a fuel exporting country like FSU/EEC would sell
more hot air in the welfare maximization case than in the revenue maximization case.
The other option for the FSU/EEC to sell a ﬁxed share of the overall permits to local and
international emitters alike has the same three eﬀects, but now the marginal abatement
8cost eﬀect also applies for the domestic economy that beneﬁts from lower permit prices,
too. Hence, energy use increases in all Annex B countries. In addition, the relative price of
energy intensive goods to the other goods falls thus leading to an expansion of these sectors.
For the hot air region FSU/EEC this means that an additional amount of hot air promotes
higher exports of energy and increased production of energy intensive goods. Compared to
revenue maximization, welfare maximization would tend to lead to a higher supply of hot
air in order to reap the beneﬁts from the increased competitiveness of energy sectors and
energy intensive industries.
When comparing the scenario ET1 in which local emitters in the region FSU/EEC are not
constrained with the scenario ET2 in which the permits are auctioned to local emitters
as well, the positive welfare eﬀect of additional supplies of hot air is larger in ET2 than
in ET1. This is so because in ET1 additional hot air reduces the comparative advantage
of energy intensive industries in the FSU/EEC whereas it improves it in ET2. Therefore
one can expect that a move from revenue maximization to welfare maximization in the
determination of the optimal supply of hot air will result in a larger diﬀerence in the
scenario ET2. The issue of maximizing welfare or revenue is therefore most important if
the FSU/EEC also use the permit system inside their own economies.
2.5 The Role of the US Participation in Hot Air Decisions
Equally important for the strategic and institutional designs is the participation of the
USA. As the largest buyer, the participation or non-participation inﬂuences the decisions
by the hot air suppliers. The withdrawal of the USA from IET and from the Kyoto com-
mitments essentially moves the largest economy into the Non-Annex B group. Although
the qualitative eﬀects of alternative hot air trading regimes remain the same, the size of
the international allocation eﬀects changes. First of all, the largest economy demanding
emission permits would withdraw from the permit market thus drastically lowering permit
prices. This would tend to reduce the optimal amount of hot air supplied.
A second eﬀect comes in through diﬀerent price reactions on world markets. Whereas an
increase in hot air supplied in the case of a US participation will lower American energy
prices it will raise them if the USA does not participate. A withdrawal of the USA would
therefore drastically increase the demand for energy which to some extent would be sup-
plied by the FSU/EEC thus beneﬁting FSU/EEC exporters of fossil fuels. At the same
time the withdrawal improves the American comparative advantage in energy intensive
products thus hurting the FSU/EEC competitive position. In scenario ET1 it also raises
energy prices within FSU/EEC thus accelerating the American comparative advantage ef-
fect in energy intensive products. In contrast, the scenario ET2 has falling energy prices in
9FSU/EEC, hence a diminished loss in comparative advantage. Which of these two eﬀects
ﬁnally dominates can only be assessed quantitatively. It is likely, however, that because
of these opposite eﬀects the participation or non-participation of the USA will make little
diﬀerence between revenue and welfare maximization.
3 Issues in Modelling Hot Air Trading
The qualitative aspects of the interactions of diﬀerent participation structures, institutional
details, and strategic supply behavior already give some important insights. However, the
net eﬀects can only be assessed in a quantitative study by using a simulation model. For
running such models a number of empirical questions need to be resolved. These include the
amount of available hot air, the regional aggregation, complications through other policies
such as CDM, JI and Banking, sinks and the way market power is actually exercised.
3.1 What is the available Amount of Hot Air?
Hot air is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between projected baseline emissions and the Kyoto
target, in the case where the former turn out to be smaller then the latter. Thus every
estimate of hot air depends on the projected baseline emissions which depend among others
on the expected economic development of the FSU/EEC. Estimates for the overall amount
of hot air available in 2010 range from 100 to 500 million metric tons of carbon (MtC). The
newest EIA data (EIA 2002) project 2010 emission to be 745 MtC in the FSU and 233 in
the EEC, while emission in 1990 were 1036 resp. 301 MtC. In addition the FSU is allowed
to credit another 46 MtC for sinks and the EEC 7.5 MtC (den Elzen and de Moor 2001a).
Thus, the amount of hot air would altogether be around 410 MtC. The largest suppliers
are Russia and the Ukraine who account for about one third of total hot air each, followed
by Romania who provides around 15% (Missfeldt and Villavicenco 2002).
Partial equilibrium models use these estimates directly (Boehringer and Loeschl 2001; den
Elzen and de Moor 2001b), while most CGE models calibrate their business as usual or
benchmark scenario where no abatement action is taken to such emission projections. Once
a certain emission path is chosen, the amount of hot air is seen as ﬁxed. This is misleading
though, as the benchmark will not materialize since climate policies will be introduced in
some regions thus changing the emission path even in regions with hot air. As soon as some
Annex B countries face binding emission constraints, gross energy prices in these countries
increase and the production of energy intensive goods is shifted to the rest of the world,
including the hot air economies that do not face emission restrictions. This is also called
”leakage” and leads to an increasing demand for energy in the rest of the world and the hot
10air countries. Hence, the amount of available hot air is decreasing. Thus, the withdrawal
of the USA from Kyoto has a double eﬀect on the importance of hot air. First it decreases
the demand for emission permits considerably. In addition, compared to the case where
the USA fulﬁlls its Kyoto commitment, less energy intensive production is shifted to the
FSU/EEC, so that the amount of available hot air increases.
Due to the leakage eﬀect, available hot air is also less in the case of emission trading
compared to the case of unilateral action. With emission trading, the same reductions can
be achieved at a lower abatement cost so that less production is shifted to non abating
countries including the FSU/EEC. In our model for example, under unilateral emission
reductions in all Annex B countries the amount of hot air is 6.3% less than in the benchmark.
The diﬀerence reduces to around 4% without the US participation or under emission trading
including the US.
Summarized, the available hot air, deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the Kyoto target and
the emissions actually demanded by the FSU/EEC depends on the economic development
in the FSU/EEC as well as on the level and cost of abatement in the rest of the world.
3.2 CDM, JI and Sinks
Three further issues that inﬂuence the amount of hot air traded are the clean development
mechanism (CDM), joint implementation (JI) and sink enhancement. CDM and JI work the
same way. Countries can get so called Certiﬁed Emission Reductions (CER) for abatement
in Non-Annex B countries in the case of CDM and Emission Reduction Units (ERU) for
emission reducing projects by two or more Annex B countries in the case of JI. In addition
the the Removal Unit (RMU) was created in Marrakech for sink credits. All mechanisms
provide alternative sources of supply of emission reduction permits for economies with high
marginal abatement costs. Hence, they lower the incentive of the Annex B countries to buy
hot air from the FSU/EEC. In the following simulations JI is treated as part of IET while
we ignore CDM and sink enhancement as substitutes for permit trading.
3.3 Banking
In Marrakech and Bonn it was agreed that general emission permits resulting from the
Kyoto commitment, the assigned amount units (AAU), can be banked without a time
constraint. CERs and ERUs can be banked up to a limit of 2.5 resp. 5% of a Party’s
initial assigned amount. RMUs can not be banked (IETA 2001). Independently of market
power, banking provides an incentive for the hot air countries to defer a part of the hot
air for later use and restrict their permit supply. Compared to a scenario of market power
11and no banking, banking increases the beneﬁts of restrictions, as the saved permits can be
used e.g., when the FSU/EEC emissions reach the Kyoto limit in future. Thus, it can be
expected that less hot air is sold compared to the no banking scenario. Manne and Richels
(2001) use intertemporal optimization in the CGE model MERGE and ﬁnd indeed that
if one looks at the period until 2020 the FSU/EEC optimally banks over 80% of hot air
if the USA participate in emission trading and even over 90% if not. This is more then
most studies ﬁnd to be optimal under market power only (see section 3.5). Using a partial
equilibrium model based on marginal abatement curves, Steenberghe (2002) considers the
period 2008-2017 and concludes that the total amount of banked permits in the ﬁrst period
is even larger than the amount of hot air. Intertemporal optimization is not uncontroversial
though. The emissions, the permit demand and the permit endowment in the post Kyoto
period are highly uncertain and it is questionable as to whether government decisions about
the intertemporal allocation of permit revenues or of welfare beneﬁts from using permits
will be based on a time horizon of more than one decade. As until 2010 the FSU/EEC
emissions will stay clearly below the Kyoto limit, it seems legitimate to focus on market
power and ignore the additional beneﬁts of banked permit for the future if one considers
only the ﬁrst commitment period.
3.4 Regional Aggregation
Another issue is, that there are several countries that can sell hot air. Due to the lack
of data most studies work with the aggregated regions FSU and EEC or even one region
FSU/EEC, which also includes Former Soviet Republics that are not Annex B countries.
The studies then assume that the FSU/EEC behaves as a monopoly/cartel or that the
FSU does so, while the EEC as a competitive fringe will follow the price leadership of the
domination region FSU or that both do not cooperate at all (Boehringer and Loeschl 2001;
Loeschl and Zhang 2002). Working with the regional aggregate FSU thus implies that
Russia and the Ukraine coordinate their behavior and build a cartel.
3.5 Strategic Behavior
As discussed in section 2, it is likely that - under certain institutional setups - the hot
air countries will act strategically. To analyze the outcome of the FSU/EEC maximizing
its welfare or revenue a modeler has to make an assumption on how the market power is
actually exercised. One possibility for the FSU/EEC is to participate in emission trading
but to put a markup much like an export tariﬀ on the FSU/EEC export price of permits.
As a result, the FSU/EEC pays a lower permit price than the rest of the Annex B countries.
This scenario, which is economically the same as an export quota, is modelled by Bernstein,
12Table 1: Selected studies on hot air trading and market power
Study/ Model Scenario Objec- Optimal %
paper US participation tive hot air
Babiker et al. EPPA Export quota; Revenue ??
(2002) (CGE) +US
Bernstein et al. MS-MRT Markup on domestic Welfare (180% markup
(1999) (CGE) price in 2010 declines
+US to 18% in 2030)
Boehringer CGE Export quotas con- 40%
(2001) -US sumption
Boehringer and PEM; supply ceiling; Revenue 1) 35%;
Loeschl (2001), (POLES*) -US 2) FSU: 35%,
Loeschl and 1) Cartel of FSU&EEC, EEC: 100%;
Zhang (2002) 2) EEC fringe supplier, 3) FSU: 32%,
3) Cournot Duopoly EEC: 100%
den Elzen and PEM supply ceiling Revenue 30-60%
de Moor (2001a, (World- -US
2001b, 2002) SCAN*) diﬀ. emission scenarios
Burniaux (1999) GREEN export quota equivalent Revenue (170% markup
(CGE) to markup -AC in 2005, 38% in
US participation? 2010, 0 in 2050)
Manne and MERGE supply ceiling; GDP 40-54%
Richels (2001) (CGE) -US
*: Provides the marginal abatement cost curves
PEM: Partial equilibrium model; CGE: Computable general equilibrium model
Montgomery, Rutherford, and Yang (1999) and also by Burniaux (1999) who assumes that
the FSU/EEC is directly setting the international permit price, and presumably also in
Boehringer and Loeschl (2001). In all the cases the FSU/EEC participates in the emission
market and does even sell more than the hot air as long as the world market price is above
its marginal abatement costs. Boehringer (2001) proceeds diﬀerently and assumes that the
FSU/EEC exports a ﬁxed amount of emission rights, while inside the FSU/EEC permits
are given away for free1. Other CGE studies just state that the FSU/EEC act as price
makers and are able to limit the amount of hot air available for sale (Manne and Richels
2001), that they do not supply all their permits on the market (Babiker et al. 2002) or talk
about a ceiling on the supply side (Paltsev 2000) without explaining what is meant by this.
1Unfortunately it is not state clearly how the FSU/EEC permit system works, but marginal abatement
cost are reported for all Annex B countries except the FSU/EEC this is what was most likely modelled.
13In summary, the models diﬀer with respect to the assumptions about the role of the
FSU/EEC, the participation of the FSU/EEC ﬁrms in emission trading, the quantita-
tive emission restrictions for domestic FSU/EEC emissions and exports and the price of
FSU/EEC emissions compared to the world market price. As discussed in section 2, there
are basically three realistic setups that we will analyze in this study to see whether the
diﬀerent settings make a diﬀerence in the allocative eﬀect.
4 Policy Simulations
In order to assess the economic implications of diﬀerent participation structures, institu-
tional details and the treatment of hot air on international emission trading, we use the
DART model for running diﬀerent policy scenarios that will be deﬁned below.
4.1 The DART Model
The DART (Dynamic Applied Regional Trade) Model is a multi-region, multi-sector re-
cursive dynamic CGE model of the world economy developed by the Kiel Institute for
World Economics to analyze climate policies. It covers 11 sectors and 12 regions that are
Table 2: Dimensions of the DART-Model
Countries and regions Production sectors
Annex B Energy
USA USA COL Coal
WEU West European Union CRU Crude Oil
ANC Canada, Australia, New Zealand GAS Natural Gas
JPN Japan OIL Reﬁned Oil Products
FSU Former Soviet Union & EGW Electricity
Eastern Europe
Non energy
Non-Annex B AGR Agricultural production
LAM Latin America IMS Iron Metal Steal
IND India CPP Chemicals, rubber, paper
PAS Paciﬁc Asia and plastic products
CPA China and Hong Kong Y Other manufactures & services
MEA Middle East and North Africa TRN Transport
AFR Sub-Saharan Africa CGD Investment good
ROW Rest of the World
14summarized in Table 2 and the two production factors labor and capital. The regional
aggregation for this study include the FSU/EEC, the USA and other Annex B parties, that
are essential for our analysis. The economic structure of the DART model is fully speciﬁed
for each region and covers production, ﬁnal consumption and investment. A more detailed
model description can be found in the appendix.
4.2 Formulation of Policy Scenarios
In order to focus on the allocative eﬀects of the diﬀerent scenarios on prices, trade and
production structure, and also for practical modelling reasons we have to make a number
of simplifying assumptions. First, we do not include banking and CDM in our study. JI is
only implicitly modelled through Annex B emission trading. The sink credits are included
in the reduction targets (see Table 3), but we do not model sink enhancement. For the
implementation of Kyoto we assume that the regions start emission reductions in 2005 and
then reduce their emission by a ﬁxed amount each year, until the target is reached in 2010.
Table 3: Emission targets after Marrakech (including sinks)
Country Original target Marrakech target
as percentage of 1990 emissions
USA 94% 96.8 %
WEU 92% 94.8%
ANC 97% 109 %
JPN 94% 99.2%
FSU/EEC 98.5% 103%
Source: (Boehringer 2001; Boehringer and Loeschl 2001)
For the hot air modelling we focus on the cartel case and aggregate all hot air countries to
the region FSU/EEC.
Besides the benchmark where we assume that no emission reductions are undertaken, the
analyzed scenarios diﬀer in two dimensions: the participation of the USA and whether the
emission reductions are taken unilaterally or internationally by emission trading.
+US: Each Annex B country including the USA reduce its emissions accordingly to its
Kyoto commitment.
-US: Only WEU, ANC and JPN reduce their emissions. The US emissions are not re-
stricted.
NOTR: The abating countries achieve their emission reductions by individually either by
15domestic emission trading or equivalently by applying a domestic carbon tax that is
high enough to meet the commitment.
As discussed in section 2 three realistic scenarios for international emission trading among
the Annex B countries, including the hot air, should be distinguished:
ET1: The government of the FSU/EEC is selling a ﬁxed number of permits (hot air) on
the international permit market. The FSU/EEC ﬁrms are isolated from the emission
market and receive their permits from the FSU/EEC government for free2.
ET2: The FSU/EEC is selling a ﬁxed number of permits to domestic and foreign emitters
alike, charging the same price. Thus, FSU/EEC ﬁrms participate in IET and the
international permit price also applies domestically.
ET3: The government grandfathers all permits (including the hot air) to its domestic ﬁrms.
These participate in the competitive international emission market.
The ﬁrst two scenarios imply that the FSU/EEC government is able to exercise market
power, the third assume competitive behavior. These scenarios are combined with the
two US participation scenarios. In addition for the scenarios ET1 and ET2 where the
FSU/EEC is able to exercise market power, we diﬀerentiate between welfare maximization
(ET1W/ET2W) and revenue maximization (ET1R/ET2R)3. All scenarios are summarized
in Table 4:
Table 4: Policy Scenarios
+US -US
NOTR NOTR+US NOTR-US unilateral action
ET1 ET1W+US ET1W-US max welfare
ET1R+US ET1R-US max revenue
ET2 ET2W+US ET2W-US max welfare
ET2R+US ET2R-US max revenue
ET3 ET3+US ET3-US competitive market
2To be precise, our CGE model assumes that the permits not designated for the world market are sold
on a domestic market. In all relevant scenarios though these domestic permits exceed the domestic demand,
so that the price is zero.
3Some studies (Burniaux 1999) also compare the FSU/EEC to a monopolistic ﬁrm and maximize permit
revenue minus total abatement cost. Market power is only relevant though in the case of government trading
and as the government does not have to pay the abatement cost, it is only interested in revenue.
16To determine the welfare and revenue maxima for scenarios ET1 and ET2 we varied the
amount of hot air supplied by the FSU/EEC from 5% to 100%. Hot air is deﬁned as the
diﬀerence between the Kyoto target and the 2010 benchmark emissions and amounts to
465 MtC in our model. The revenue is in both scenarios the revenue for exported permits.
Thus, in scenario ET2 the FSU/EEC government does not consider the revenue from its
permit sells to local emitters, as it is only a redistribution in the own country.
5 Simulation results
All following results refer to the year 2010.
5.1 US withdrawal from Kyoto
Our ﬁrst question is, how the US withdrawal inﬂuences the other regions and especially
the remaining Annex B countries. As explained in section 2, the allocative eﬀects stem
from changes in the energy markets. The additional US demand for energy increases fossil
fuel prices, and in turn eﬀect marginal abatement costs. To separate the latter two from
the decrease in international permit prices through lower US permit demand in the case of
emission trading, we ﬁrst compare the scenarios NOTR+US and NOTR-US. The results
are summarized in Table 5.
As postulated in section 2 there is a signiﬁcant impact of the withdrawal of the USA on
the gross prices of fossil fuels and especially the oil price. What happens is, that without
emission restrictions the USA demand more fossil fuels on the world market than if they
follow the Kyoto Protocol. In turn, the world market price is driven up. This can be
seen if one looks at the fossil fuel prices in the Non-Annex B countries in Table 54 which
presumably are not subject to climate policy measures such as taxes or permits although
they might somehow be distorted by other taxes and/or substitutes. The magnitude of
the price increase depends on the import and export elasticities for the diﬀerent fuels in
the diﬀerent regions. While coal prices increase by 2 - 6%, gas prices rise by only 1 -
2%. The rise in oil prices has the lowest variance and is 3 - 4% in all Non-Annex B
countries. In the Annex B countries excluding the US, there is a second eﬀect that works
in a diﬀerent direction: the higher world market prices reduce the demand for fossil fuels
which automatically lead to lower emissions. Thus, the ﬁxed emission target requires less
additional abatement and is less costly. In other words, marginal abatement costs decline
as we can also see in Table 5. Taken together the US withdrawal leads to higher net prices
4To avoid extensive data tables we restricted the reported data for the non Annex B regions to MEA as
a representative energy exporting region and CPA as a representative energy importing region.
17Table 5: US withdrawal from Kyoto
Welfare (EV) Emissions in GtC Shadow price US$/tC
bench- NOTR bench- NOTR NOTR
mark +US -US mark +US -US +US -US
USA 100 99.6 100.1 1.73 1.38 1.75 90.28
WEU 100 98.6 98.4 1.05 0.94 0.94 51.68 45.19
ANC 100 97.2 98.1 0.26 0.23 0.23 58.34 52.51
JPN 100 98.0 97.9 0.40 0.32 0.32 130.12 122.64
FSU 100 98.3 98.9 0.91 0.94 0.93
MEA 100 96.4 98.1 0.55 0.57 0.56
CPA 100 100.3 100.2 1.33 1.37 1.35
WORLD 100 99.4 99.6 8.20 7.81 8.10
Gross price COL* Gross price GAS* Gross price OIL*
bench- NOTR bench- NOTR bench- NOTR
mark +US -US mark +US -US mark +US -US
USA 1.47 2.64 1.44 1.27 1.65 1.27 1.59 1.85 1.55
WEU 1.55 2.05 2.04 1.27 1.46 1.45 1.71 1.87 1.89
ANC 1.55 2.22 2.20 1.27 1.54 1.53 1.69 1.84 1.88
JPN 1.61 3.25 3.21 1.31 1.81 1.81 1.49 1.88 1.89
FSU 1.44 1.36 1.40 1.24 1.22 1.23 1.65 1.57 1.61
MEA 1.61 1.42 1.50 1.42 1.39 1.40 1.81 1.70 1.76
CPA 2.29 2.16 2.21 1.92 1.87 1.90 1.78 1.67 1.73
¤ 1997 = 1
of energy whereas gross prices in the remaining Annex B countries vary. We can see that
gross prices for coal and gas fall while the oil prices increase. The explanation is that for
gas, the rise in net price was relatively low, so that the decrease in marginal abatement
costs dominates. The carbon content of coal on the other hand is more than twice as high as
the carbon content of gas. Thus, the drop in abatement costs dominates the price increase.
Oil ﬁnally has a relatively low carbon content and in addition the price for oil increases
more than the one for gas. In this case, the world market eﬀect dominates the marginal
abatement cost eﬀect.
If we now look at the welfare eﬀects of the US withdrawal, we ﬁnd that their sign can
be explained by the gross energy prices quite well. In the non abating countries, where
gross prices are rising, welfare increases in the energy exporting regions FSU/EEC, MEA,
LAM and AFR and decreases in the energy importing regions CPA, PAS and IND. As oil
covers the largest part of energy in the remaining Annex B countries, the oil price eﬀect
dominates and gross energy prices also rise on average. Again we see, that energy exporters
18gain (ANC) while energy importers (WEU, JPN) lose welfare.
These ﬁndings, especially concerning the gross prices for fossil fuels were based on the
observation that marginal abatement costs (MACs) are aﬀected by the US withdrawal.
Obviously the marginal abatement cost curves (MACCs), on which all partial equilibrium
studies are based, are not as stable as Ellerman and Decaux (1998) claim them to be. To
underline the ﬁnding that MACs decrease with higher US demand and rising fossil fuel
prices, we generated the full MACCs for the NOTR+US and NOTR-US scenario along the
lines of Ellerman and Decaux. We varied the eﬀective emission reductions relative to the
benchmark of one Annex B country while the others (including or excluding the US) were
assumed to fulﬁll their Kyoto commitment.
As Table 6 shows we ﬁnd that for low emission reductions MACs in the two scenarios
can deviate by over 20%. The variation is especially high for Europe where the diﬀerence
between the NOTR+US and NOTR-US scenario reaches 14.4% for the Kyoto target. For
ANC it is still over 10% (11.1%). Only for JPN who has committed to relatively high
eﬀective emission reductions of 20.4% in 2010 (compared to 9.9% for WEU and 13.1% for
ANC) the diﬀerence is only 6.1%.
The mechanisms behind these results can be explained by looking at the domestic market
for fossil fuels in the Annex B countries. Let’s take for example the oil market in the WEU
as illustrated in Figure 1. Line d signiﬁes the domestic WEU demand for oil. Since each
barrel of oil contains a ﬁxed amount of carbon, we can put the associated CO2 emissions































Figure 1: marginal abatement costs and fossil fuel prices
19Table 6: Marginal abatement cost curves
WEU JPN
Reduction1 MAC2 in NOTR diﬀ. Reduction1 MAC2 in NOTR diﬀ.
in % in GtC +US -US in % in % in GtC +US -US in %
5 0.05 30.36 23.77 -21.7 5 0.02 33.67 26.44 21.5
9.9* 0.10 51.68 45.19 -14.4 10 0.04 59.28 51,.96 -12.4
10 0.11 52.35 45.86 -12.4 15 0.06 89.81 82.40 -8.3
15 0.16 77.60 71.21 -8.2 20 0.08 126.30 118.82 -5.9
20 0.21 106.79 100.50 -4.3 20.4* 0.08 130.12 122.64 -6.1
25 0.26 143.74 137.59 -4.3 25 0.10 174.60 167.13 -4.3
30 0.32 180.69 174.68 -3.3 30 0.12 222.91 215.44 -3.3
40 0.42 284.85 279.28 -2.0 40 0.16 366.38 359.17 -2.0
ANC USA
Reduction1 MAC2 in NOTR diﬀ. Reduction1 MAC2 in NOTR
in % in GtC +US -US in % in % in GtC +US
5 0.01 26.80 20.78 -22.5 5 0.09 22.90
10 0.03 44.99 39.09 -13.1 10 0.17 42.97
13.1* 0.03 58.34 52.51 -11.1 15 0.26 65.27
15 0.04 66.11 60.32 -8.8 19.8* 0.34 90.28
20 0.05 90.79 85.12 -6.2 20 0.35 91.36
25 0.07 122.54 117.01 -4.5 25 0.43 128.43
30 0.08 154.29 148.90 -3.5 30 0.51 158.28
40 0.10 245.47 240.55 -2.0 40 0.69 256.94
1: Emission reduction in 2010 relative to benchmark *: Kyoto target
2: marginal abatement cost in US$/tC
20Assume that the oil price that is determined on the world market is initially p0. Without
any emission constraints WEU would emit e0 MtC. If the WEU now commits to emit only
c1, the marginal abatement cost is the diﬀerence between p0 and the price that would lead
to c1 MtC. In Figure 1 this diﬀerence is denoted t1. t1 is also equal to the emission tax that
would have to be levied to achieve target c1 or the permit price that would build under
domestic permit trading. One can also see that under a stricter commitment c2, the MAC
would rise to t2.
If now the USA withdraw from Kyoto and its higher oil demand on the world market
increases the world market price to p1, the emissions associated with unrestricted oil demand
decrease to e1. In addition the diﬀerence between the world market price and the price
that is needed to achieve a certain emission target (the MAC) decrease exactly by ∆p =
p1 ¡ p0 independent of the level of the target. As the absolute diﬀerence is the same
for all abatement levels, the percentage diﬀerence is highest at low abatement levels with
associated low MACs.
The level of ∆p on the domestic market depends on how much the domestic price is corre-
lated with the world market price. With oil though, this correlation should be very high.
In Table 6 we can see indeed, that the diﬀerence in the MACs between the NOTR+US and
NOTR-US scenario is relatively constant across countries and across abatement levels.
In summary, if the world market price of fossil fuels increases by ∆p through the US
withdrawal, the MACs in the remaining Annex B countries shift by approximately the
same amount. As a result, percentage diﬀerences are higher with lower emission targets
and lower MACs. We can conclude that it is not suﬃcient to analyze the permit market
alone to determine the allocative implications of diﬀerent participation and institutional
details of scenarios for international emission trading. At least the interactions with the
world energy markets, especially the oil market should also be considered. In practice this
means that not only movements along the MACCs should be analyzed but also the shift of
the MACCs.
5.2 Trading hot air
Our second question is how the diﬀerent institutional set ups ET1-ET3 that diﬀer in (1) the
objective of the FSU/EEC (welfare vs. revenue maximization), (2) the permit allocation in
the FSU/EEC, and (3) the participation of the USA inﬂuence the outcome of international
emission trading. First, we compare welfare and revenue maximization in the two scenarios
with market power (ET1 and ET2). Next, we assess how the non-participation (ET1) resp.
participation (ET2) of the FSU/EEC ﬁrms in the permit market inﬂuences the outcome
of the optimization process. In this context we also investigate the impacts of the USA
21withdrawal. Finally we take a closer look at scenario ET2R as it shows the largest diﬀerence
to the other scenarios and on competitive trading (ET3).
Welfare versus revenue maximization
As discussed in section 2 welfare and revenue maximization do not lead to the same re-
sult and it can be expected that the optimal amount of hot air is larger under welfare
maximization. Table 7 shows that this is indeed the case. Note that the provision of a
certain percentage of hot air does not lead to the same overall FSU/EEC emissions in the
two scenarios. While in scenario ET1 the domestic FSU/EEC emissions change relative to
the benchmark due to the increase in international fossil fuel prices. Such a leakage can
not occur in scenario ET2 where the FSU/EEC government restricts the total amounts of
permits used by foreign and domestic ﬁrms.
Table 7: Welfare versus Revenue maximization
Welfare maximization Revenue maximization
Scenario hot Permit Wel- hot Permit Wel-
air1 price2 exp3 emis4 fare5 air1 price2 exp3 emis4 fare5
ET1+US 65% 32.91 302 1230 103.1 60% 36.10 278 1208 103.1
ET1-US 30% 19.55 139 1058 100.7 25% 25.62 116 1037 100.7
ET2+US 70% 21.51 397 1237 101.8 30% 39.67 267 1052 101.0
ET2-US 35% 7.68 190 1074 100.1 0% 31.14 105 912 99.1
ET3+US 8.64 494 1376 101.1
ET3-US 0.00 220 1132 100.0 equivalent to benchmark
1: optimal % hot air (hot air = 2010 benchmark emissions minus Kyoto target = 465 MtC)
2: in US$ je tC
3: FSU/EEC permit exports in MtC
4: domestic + exported emissions from FSU/EEC in MtC
5: benchmark 2010 = 100
Moving from revenue to welfare maximization in the scenario ET1 where the FSU/EEC
ﬁrms receive their permits for free the hot air supply rises by only around 5% points.
As the loss in welfare due to revenue maximization is close to zero (0.01%) though, both
mechanisms lead in fact approximately to the same results as Babiker, Jacoby, Reilly, and
Reiner (2002) claim. If the FSU/EEC ﬁrms are participating in emission trading, the
diﬀerence is - as postulated in section 2 as well - much larger. Now, welfare maximization
leads to the provision of 70% of the hot air with US participation and 35% without US
participation while it would be optimal to sell only 30% respectively no hot air to maximize
revenue. The reason for this large diﬀerence was already explained in section 2. In scenario
22ET1 the provision of more hot air increases welfare through higher energy exports and
decreases it by a lose in the comparative advantage in the production of energy intensive
goods. In contrast, the comparative advantage is increased through a larger hot air supply
in scenario ET2, as the domestic FSU/EEC ﬁrms gain from lower permit prices as well.
Here, both eﬀects work in the same direction and increase welfare from the additional
supply of hot air. In ET2, revenue maximization results in a welfare loss of approximately
1%. The welfare and revenue curves of the diﬀerent restrictions are plotted in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Welfare versus Revenue Maximization
Comparing revenue and welfare maximization from the point of view of the FSU/EEC, the
ﬁnal welfare result in practically identical in the scenarios ET1 with unconstrained emissions
in the FSU/EEC. This is mainly due to the fact that the revenue eﬀect dominates and energy
price eﬀects of increased energy exports through an increase in hot air are compensated
by the loss in comparative advantage of energy-intensive industries thus leaving a very
small net eﬀect. This is quite diﬀerent in ET2 where both competitive eﬀects go into the
same direction, such that increasing hot air supplies beyond the revenue maximizing level
eﬀectively raises welfare. The curvature of the welfare and revenue curves (Figure 2) also
indicate that from a welfare point of view the exact amount of hot air supplied does not
matter much since the curves turn out quite ﬂat. Only if the governments look for revenue
maximization in ET2 the determination of the share of hot air brought to international
markets makes an important diﬀerence.
Comparison of the two institutional setups under welfare maximization
Under welfare maximization, the deviation between the provided hot air in the two insti-
tutional setups ET1 and ET2 is relatively small and overall FSU/EEC emissions (domestic
23plus exported) are almost identical. The diﬀerence between the two scenarios can only be
seen in the variation in the world permit price and the resulting world prices for fossil fuels.
If the FSU/EEC ﬁrms are participating in trading (ET2W), the permit price is lower. As
the abatement costs in the FSU are relatively small compared to the rest of the world, the
FSU/EEC ﬁrms sell in scenario ET2W not only the hot air, but also additional permits
stemming from domestic reductions. 20% (+US) resp. 15% (-US) of the FSU/EEC permits
sold on the international permit market are not hot air but are associated with emission
reductions in the FSU/EEC. The resulting increase in permit supply cuts down the permit
price and raises energy demand in the countries participating in emission trading. Thus,
with lower permit prices net energy prices go up world wide while gross prices decline
in the countries that participate in emission trading. In the energy exporting countries,
the FSU/EEC trading scenario ET2W with its higher energy demand and higher world
market prices welfare increases. The energy importing countries are better oﬀ with the
FSU/EEC grandfathering its permits (ET1W) and the resulting higher permit price and
lower net energy price. This is also the case for the FSU/EEC itself. It faces lower gross
energy prices in scenario ET1W resulting in 1.3% (+US) resp. 0.6% (-US) welfare increase
compared to scenario ET2W. This is so because the FSU/EEC under welfare maximization
can by selecting the optimal hot air supply introduce the equivalent of an optimal tariﬀ on
fossil energy.
The impact of the two institutional regimes on the welfare in the abating Annex B countries
is predominantly determined by the permit price eﬀect. In ET1 prices of 33 $/tC with US
participation and 22 $/tC without the US prevail. They are by more than 10 $/tC lower
in ET2. This is due to the fact that in addition to the expected ”oﬃcial” hot air - i.e.
benchmark emissions in 2010 minus Kyoto target - at the world market price domestic
permits will be sold since the FSU/EEC has suﬃciently low marginal abatement costs.
As a consequence regions like WEU get cheaper permits in ET2 than in ET1 and thus
experience higher welfare eﬀects in ET2.
Finally we compare the scenarios of hot air trading with and without the USA. All things
said so far also apply here. What is striking though, is the signiﬁcant drop in permit prices
without the USA. Even though the FSU/EEC react to the decreased permit demand by
cutting the supply of hot air by half, the permit prices fall by 13 $/tC which is 40% in ET1
and over 60% in ET2. The reason is that in both scenarios ET1+US and ET2+US the
USA are responsible for around 60% of world permit demand. Under emission trading the
US withdrawal thus not only induces a shift of the marginal abatement cost curves but also
a downward move along the curves itself. Taken together the sharp drop in permit prices
dominates the increase in fossil fuel prices in all abating Annex B countries, so that all gross
prices for fossil energy - including the oil price which was rising in the NOTR-US scenario
- decline. We can see in Table 8 that without the US welfare increases in all abating Annex
B countries. From the point of view of the FSU/EEC the US withdrawal implies a loss in 24Table 8: Comparison between the diﬀerent institutional setups under optimal FSU/EEC
behavior
Welfare (Equivalent Variation)
bench ET1W ET2W ET2R ET3
(ET3-US) +US -US +US -US +US -US +US
US 100 99.7 100.0 99.8 100.0 99.7 100.0 99.9
WEU 100 98.9 99.2 99.4 99.7 98.8 98.9 99.7
ANC 100 98.5 99.2 98.9 99.7 98.1 98.7 99.5
JPN 100 99.6 99.7 99.8 99.9 99.6 99.5 99.0
FSU 100 103.1 100.7 101.8 100.1 101.0 99.1 101.1
MEA 100 98.5 99.4 98.9 99.7 98.0 98.9 99.6
CPA 100 100.1 100.1 100.1 100.0 100.2 100.1 100.0
Emissions in GtC
bench ET1W ET2W ET2R ET3
(ET3-US) +US -US +US -US +US -US +US
US 1.72 1.59 1.73 1.63 1.73 1.56 1.74 1.69
WEU 1.05 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.03 0.97 0.98 1.03
ANC 0.26 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.24 0.26
JPN 0.40 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.38 0.38 0.40
FSU 0.91 0.93 0.92 0.84 0.88 0.79 0.81 0.88
MEA 0.55 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56
CPA 1.33 1.35 1.33 1.34 1.33 1.36 1.35 1.33
WORLD 8.20 8.02 8.16 8.02 8.16 7.88 8.06 8.13
Gross Oil Price (1997 = 1)
bench ET1W ET2W ET2R ET3
(ET3-US) +US -US +US -US +US -US +US
US 1.59 1.68 1.58 1.64 1.58 1.69 1.57 1.61
WEU 1.71 1.83 1.79 1.78 1.74 1.85 1.84 1.74
ANC 1.69 1.79 1.76 1.75 1.72 1.80 1.80 1.72
JPN 1.49 1.57 1.54 1.54 1.51 1.58 1.58 1.51
FSU 1.65 1.62 1.64 1.72 1.68 1.78 1.76 1.68
MEA 1.81 1.77 1.79 1.78 1.80 1.75 1.78 1.80
CPA 1.78 1.74 1.76 1.75 1.77 1.72 1.75 1.77
25welfare as the permit revenue declines by around 70% in both scenarios ET1 and ET2. The
welfare loss is higher in ET1 (2.3%) than in ET2 (1.7%) as in ET2 the FSU/EEC ﬁrms
beneﬁt from the lower permit prices as well which compensates for part of the revenue loss.
Revenue maximization in scenario ET2
The scenario ET2 in which the FSU/EEC auctions oﬀ permits to the domestic emitters
is of particular interest. The diﬀerence between revenue and welfare maximization under
the optimal hot air supply is largest, and under revenue maximization the lowest emissions
word wide as well as the lowest emissions from the FSU/EEC (including the exported hot
air) will be achieved.
The emission eﬀect is, of course due to the positive price on emissions imposed on local
emitters in the FSU/EEC. But the hot air available at the government - deﬁned as the
diﬀerence between the Kyoto commitment and benchmark emissions - will also not be
supplied on world markets. The reason is the high price for permits. At high prices
only few permits will be sold internally, hence the eﬀective amount of permits that can
be brought to the international market increases. One could also explain this eﬀect in a
diﬀerent setting, where local emitters receive permits accordingly to benchmark emissions
which then are tradable on the international market. At the world market prices and the
low abatement costs more than 100 MtC would be supplied by the private sector of the
FSU/EEC. Maximizing revenues of permit sales including the private supplies would result
only in a small share of hot air supplied. In fact, without the USA participation it would
be optimal to keep all hot air because the private supplies would already suﬃce to reach
the revenue maximum for the FSU/EEC5.
These internal incentives to supply hot air also in part explain the drastic rise in hot
air supplies in the case of welfare maximization. Increasing hot air supplies improve the
competitive situation of the energy sectors in the FSU/EEC as discussed above. The
additional hot air also lowers permit prices. With the USA in the Kyoto-process from 40
$/tC to 22 $/tC and without the USA from 31 $/tC to less than 8 $/tC. Such a drop in
permit prices drastically reduces the permit supply of local emitters, hence the government
can increase its supplies strongly, i.e. from 30% to 70% in ET2+US and from 0% to 35%
in ET2-US. Finally it is interesting to note in the case without the US demand (ET2-US)
almost any hot air supply is close to the welfare maximum, probably because the revenue
eﬀect from the international permit market and the competitiveness eﬀect together with
the abatement cost eﬀect inside the FSU/EEC seem to substitute each other.
5The result of an optimal supply of 0% of hot air is accidental. In fact, the optimal supply is slightly
below 0%, i.e. the FSU/EEC would bank even more than the predicted amount of hot air.
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Our third institutional set up in the FSU/EEC (ET3) assumed that the government grand-
fathers all its emission rights, including the hot air to the local ﬁrms that participate in
international emission trading. This leads to a competitive market. As a result the supply
of hot air is not restricted and the permit price falls in IET from 33 $/tC in ET1+US and
22 $/tC in ET2+US to 8 $/tC in ET3+US. The withdrawal of the USA now leads to an
excess supply of hot air, so that the prize drops to zero and scenario ET3-US reduces to
the benchmark. The exported 220 MtC reported in Table 8 is the amount of hot air supply
at which the price reaches zero. Thus, in the benchmark WEU, JPN and ANC emit to-
gether 220 MtC more then their common Kyoto target. In any case, ET3 is associated with
the lowest permit prices and the highest world market prices for fossil fuels with the well
known implications for energy exporting and importing countries and the abating Annex
B regions. Finally, if we compare the FSU/EEC welfare under strategic behavior to the
welfare under a competitive market, we can see that only under ET1 the FSU/EEC can
signiﬁcantly gain welfare (3%). Under scenario ET2 the increase in welfare compared to
ET3 is almost negligible. The reason is that ET3 is the same scenario as ET2 with 100%
hot air supply. As already explained, the welfare curve in Figure 2 is quite ﬂat and the
gains from further permit revenue through a restriction of hot air are compensated by the
higher domestic permit prices.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we analyzed the impacts of the interaction between diﬀerent participation
structures, institutional set ups and strategic supply of hot air in international emission
trading. It turns out that the allocation eﬀects are to a large degree inﬂuenced by the
impact of the permit trading and the participation structure on the prices for fossil fuels
and especially those for for crude oil. Therefore they should be explicitly considered in
studies of alternative emission trading regimes. This has consequences for those analysis
that only work with marginal abatement cost curves derived from CGE-studies since these
curves are not independent from the level of energy prices. In other words, changes in energy
prices will shift the marginal abatement cost curves more than marginally. This becomes
not only apparent in the analysis of the withdrawal of the USA from the Kyoto-Protocol,
it can also be observed when diﬀerent supplies of hot air are analyzed.
Hot air supplies of mainly Russia and the Ukraine are important topics, of course. Many
studies have found a wide range of optimal hot air supplies. We have shown that the permit
allocation within the hot air countries is an important determinant of hot air supplies. Three
27institutional scenarios appear to be most realistic:
² the FSU/EEC governments give emission permits to the domestic ﬁrms for free and
isolates them from the international permit market while the governments themselves
trade a certain percentage of the hot air on the world market,
² domestic ﬁrms participate in IET either directly or indirectly through JI but the
FSU/EEC government controls the amount of permits that are available for both
domestic ﬁrms and international entities,
² the FSU/EEC government grandfathers all emission permits to local ﬁrms that par-
ticipate in IET
Within these three settings optimal hot air supplies vary between 0% and 35% in a trading
system without the USA and between 30% and 7% with the USA participating. This
variation is also inﬂuenced by the objective function used by the governments of the hot
air countries provided they cooperate in order to strategically restrict the supply of hot air.
Under welfare maximization always more hot air is sold than under revenue maximization,
mainly because under welfare maximization hot air supplies can be used as trade policies
for energy sectors and for energy-intensive industries.
The question as to whether the optimal degree of hot air really is an important one for
the hot air economies depends mainly on the objective they are pursuing. In the case of
a simple revenue maximization of revenues from the export of permits, it matters simply
because - in the case of US participation and free permits to local producers - revenues can
be increased from roughly 6 billion US$ to 10 billion if hot air exports are restricted to 60%.
Similarly strong eﬀects occur in the other scenarios. It does not matter much if welfare
maximization is the objective. A variation in the share of hot air supplied has almost no
eﬀect on welfare. This happens because restricting hot air raises revenues but it also hurts
the domestic industry regardless whether local producers pay for emissions or not. Again
the competitiveness eﬀects of the energy price changes which accompany the variation in
hot air are at work. There is on exception, though, in scenario ET1-US (no participation
of the USA, free non-tradable permits in the FSU/EEC) the permit market is so thin such
that the negative permit price eﬀect always dominates the competitiveness eﬀect.
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30A The DART Model
Basic structure
The DART (Dynamic Applied Regional Trade)Model is a multi-region, multi-sector re-
cursive dynamic CGE model of the world economy covering 12 regions and 11 sectors that
are summarized in section 3.1 and the two production factors labor and capital. The sec-
toral aggregation covers among others the main energy sectors. The economic structure is
fully speciﬁed for each region and covers production and ﬁnal consumption. Each market
is perfectly competitive. Output and factor prices are fully ﬂexible. For each region the
model incorporates two types of agents: producers, distinguished by production sector and
the ﬁnal consumer which comprises an representative household and the government.
Producer behavior is derived from cost minimization for a given output. Each industry
is characterized by a multi-level nested separable constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
function that describes the technological substitution possibilities between a value added
composite of capital and labor, energy and non-energy intermediate inputs in domestic
production. The distinction between energy and non-energy intermediate products is useful
in the context of climate policies.
The ﬁnal consumer receives all income generated by providing primary factors to the
production process. A ﬁxed share of income is saved in each time period. These saving
are invested in the production sectors. The disposable income (net of savings and taxes) is
then used for maximizing utility by purchasing goods. The expenditure function is mod-
elled as a CES composite which combines consumption of an energy aggregate and a non-
energy-bundle. Within the non-energy consumption composite, substitution possibilities
are characterized by a Cobb-Douglas function of Armington goods.
To analyze climate policies CO2 emissions are calculated for ﬁnal and intermediate energy
consumption.
All regions are linked by bilateral trade ﬂows and all goods, except the investment good,
are traded among regions. Following the proposition of Armington 1969 (1969), domestic
and foreign goods are imperfect substitutes distinguished by country of origin. Import
demand is a three stage, nested separable CES cost resp. expenditure function. On the
ﬁrst level domestic and imported goods are substitutes. Imports are itself a composite
of the sum of exports and transportation costs form each other. On the export side, the
Armington assumption applies to ﬁnal output of the industry sectors destined for domestic
and international markets.
Factor markets are perfectly competitive and full employment of all factors is assumed.
Labor is assumed to be a homogenous good, mobile across industries within regions but
31internationally immobile. In the basic version of the DART model capital is inter-sectorally
but not internationally mobile. Capital stock is given at the beginning of each time period
and results from the capital accumulation equation.
Dynamics
The DART model is recursive-dynamic, meaning that it solves for a sequence of static
one-period equilibria for future time periods connected through capital accumulation. The
major driving exogenous factors of the model dynamics are population change, the rate of
labor productivity growth, the change in human capital, the savings rate, the gross rate
of return on capital, and thus the endogenous rate of capital accumulation. The savings
behavior of regional households is characterized by a constant savings rate over time.
Labor supply considers human capital accumulation and is, therefore, measured in eﬃciency
units, Lr;t. It evolves exogenously over time. Hence, labor supply for each region r at the
beginning of time period t+1 is given by:
¯ Lr;t+1 = ¯ Lr;t ¤ (1 + gpr;t + gar;t + ghr)
where the bar denotes exogenous variables. An increase of eﬀective labor implies either
growth of the human capital accumulated per physical unit of labor, ghr, population growth
gpr or total factor productivity gar or the sum of all.
The version of the DART model used for this paper assumes constant, but regionally dif-
ferent labor productivity improvement rates, gar, constant but regionally diﬀerent growth
rates of human capital, ghr, which stem from Hall and Jones (1999), and declining popula-
tion growth rates over time,gpr;t, according to the World Bank population growth projec-
tions. Because of the lack of data for the evolution of the labor participation rate in the
future the growth rate of population instead of the labor force is used implying that the
labor participation rate is constant over time.
Current period’s investment augments the capital stock in the next period. The aggregated
regional capital stock, Kst at period t is updated by an accumulation function equating
the next-period capital stock, Kstt+1, to the sum of the depreciated capital stock of the
current period and the current period’s physical quantity of investment, Iqr;t. The equation
of motion for capital stock Kstr;t+1 in region r is given by:
Kstr;t+1 = (1 ¡ ±t)Kstr;t + Iqr;t
where ±t denotes the exogenously given constant depreciation rate. The allocation of capital
among sectors follows from the intra-period optimization of the ﬁrms.
For a detailed description of the DART-Model see (Springer 2002).
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The static part of the DART-Model is currently calibrated to the GTAP version 5 database
that represents global production and trade data for countries and regions, commodities
and primary factors for the year 1997. Thus, DART is based on more actual data than most
other models that still work with GTAP4 data for the year 1995 or even with older data.
As the model is solved as a mixed complementary problem (MCP) using the Mathemati-
cal Programming Subsystem for General Equilibrium (MPSGE) described by Rutherford
(1999), the GTAP data are transformed using the GTAPtoGAMS algorithm provided by
Rutherford and Paltsev (2000). In addition the elasticities of substitution for the energy
intermediate goods coal (0.6), gas (1.5) and crude oil (0.33) are chosen to reproduce the
emission in 2030 that are projected from the IPCC6.
Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol
To model the implementation of the Kyoto protocol, we assume that Annex B countries
start abatement in 2005. In the following years emissions are reduced by the same absolute
amount each year, until the target is reached in 2010.
To calculate the appropriate emission targets for our model, we run our model for the year
1997 with the base data. The resulting 1997 emissions are compared to the actual EIA
data (EIA 2002). As DART overestimates emission for some countries and underestimates
it for other, we use the diﬀerences to adjust the oﬃcial 1990 emission data from EIA (2002).
These adjusted 1990 data are ﬁnally multiplied with the reduction requirement implied by
the Marrakech agreement. Table 3 in section 4.2 lists these new Marrakech targets as they
are reported by Boehringer (2001). To calculate the rates for our regional aggregation these
data are combined with the EIA emission estimates for 1990.
6For the calibration we choose the ”middle” scenario B2 from (IPCC 2001) and calculate the average
prognosis from all model used
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